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In response to scientific research suggesting that global climate change is a seri-
ous prospect, political negotiations have sought to establish an international
regulatory policy to constrain greenhouse gas emissions. Major new treaties—
the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol—have been negotiated. But identifying the problem is not the same as
crafting the solution. Climate science is a necessary but not sufficient basis for
climate policy. It remains crucial, and often not simple, to design the regulatory
system best suited to addressing global climate change.1
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, a scholar of regulatory design,
observed two decades ago that “mismatches” defeat many well-intentioned regula-
tory programs and that regulatory systems should match the social and environ-
mental systems they regulate.2 More specifically, regulatory programs should
employ cost-effective tools, foster creativity in achieving solutions, and match the
scale of the ecosystems and spillover effects they are meant to govern. But actual
legal responses have too often created mismatches with social and environmental
systems, such as regulatory programs that are unduly narrow and inflexible, result-
ing in excessive costs or even perverse increases in environmental harm.
Global climate change plainly illustrates this problem. Climate change is
complex on many dimensions, frustrating simple and hasty regulatory
responses. The challenge is to design a regulatory system that matches these
complex realities and thereby accomplishes cost-effective advances in global
environmental protection. At least three kinds of complexity confront regula-
tory design for global climate change: causal complexity, spatial complexity, and
temporal complexity.
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Causal complexity denotes the diverse interconnected factors that drive cli-
mate change. Multiple greenhouse gases (GHGs) are affected by almost every
human activity, including industry, transportation, agriculture, and forest man-
agement. The sources and sinks of the multiple GHGs are numerous and wide-
spread. Policies aimed at only one of these causal factors, such as one GHG, can
unintentionally exacerbate other causal factors. If global climate regulation is to
be effective, it must address these complex causal factors comprehensively; it
must match the causal scope of the problem. Yet there are persistent pressures to
design regulatory regimes narrowly.
Spatial complexity involves the great breadth and diversity of GHG sources
and sinks in almost every country. Regulating a global problem is difficult
because the institutions of governance are not matched to the spatial scale of the
problem. Geographically narrow policies limited to one country or region may
induce emitting activities to relocate to other areas. But establishing global envi-
ronmental regulations is more difficult than instituting national ones; without a
global government (in part for some good reasons), global regulations must be
made by the cooperation of numerous national governments. Across the planet,
countries have diverse economies, social norms, political institutions, and inter-
ests. This spatial diversity makes a single uniform regulatory approach unwise
and makes global cooperation on coordinated regulatory policies difficult. Fur-
thermore, whereas national law typically is imposed by some form of majority
vote, at the international level each nation is sovereign and is bound only by the
treaties to which it consents. Compliance with national pollution control laws
can be compelled, but participation in international treaties cannot be com-
pelled and must instead be attracted. Effective climate regulation must therefore
deal with global scale, global diversity, and the global legal framework.
Temporal complexity refers to the dynamic character over time of the cli-
mate, human activities and technologies, and our understanding of these sys-
tems. Climate policy cannot be made once and for all; it must be updated to
adapt to changing circumstances and knowledge. Yet designing a dynamically
adaptive regulatory regime is difficult: We never have full knowledge of the
future, investors want predictable rules, early decisions about emissions and
investments may endure for many years, and political planning horizons may
not match environmental time horizons. And even a climate policy without
repeated adaptation must decide how to allocate abatement efforts over time. 
Nevertheless, through careful analysis an effective and efficient global regu-
latory regime for climate change can be constructed. A comprehensive, incen-
tive-based, and adaptive regulatory design can be matched to the casual, spatial
and temporal complexities of global climate change.
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Causal Complexity and Comprehensive Scope3
The Scope of Environmental Regulation
How comprehensive should environmental regulation be? When faced with a
problem, how much of it should we try to tackle? The essence of the environ-
ment is its interconnectedness. But the complexities of policymaking often push
decision makers toward narrow, piecemeal solutions that address one obvious
symptom or cause of an environmental problem. Advocates of narrow solutions
claim that limited, incremental steps are easier to accomplish than broader, com-
prehensive approaches.4
Piecemeal regulatory strategies, however, may ignore the full scope of a prob-
lem, miss lower-cost options to achieve better results, and produce unintended
side effects.5 A broader, more comprehensive approach takes into account the
complex nature of environmental issues. It attempts to match the regulatory
design to the complex environmental system being regulated.
Discussions about global climate change policy in the late 1980s centered on
reducing the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted from the energy sector
because CO2 was the most plentiful greenhouse gas, and the energy sector was
the largest source of CO2. The initial negotiating positions of major countries
proposed a treaty calling for cuts in energy sector CO2.
But at the same time, scientists were demonstrating to policymakers that
CO2 was only one of several important GHGs. First, although the volume of
CO2 emitted far exceeds that of other GHGs, each CO2 molecule is a weak
absorber of infrared radiation (heat). Other GHGs, such as methane (CH4) and
nitrous oxide (N2O), are important contributors to global warming potential
because despite their smaller volume of emissions, they are roughly 20 and 300
times more potent per unit, respectively, than CO2 at retaining heat in the
atmosphere over time. Thus CO2 was estimated to be responsible for only about
one-half 6 of the global warming potential of anthropogenic GHG emissions in
the 1980s.
Second, the relative influence of CH4 and N2O was expected to increase in
the future. GHGs absorb infrared radiation in wavelengths specific to each gas.
As the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen, more and more of the
infrared radiation at the wavelength blocked by CO2 molecules is already being
absorbed. Because of this saturation effect, additional emissions of abundant
atmospheric gases such as CO2 will have decreasing marginal impacts relative to
those of less abundant gases such as methane. Thus, narrowly targeting CO2 and
omitting the other salient GHGs would limit the effectiveness of the regulatory
regime in averting climate change.
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Advantages of the Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change
Environmental Advantages
Taking a comprehensive approach to climate policy has several significant
advantages. First, it is environmentally superior. Piecemeal approaches ignore
important sources of the problem and thus neglect important opportunities to
solve it. Moreover, they tend to be self-defeating because efforts to solve one
aspect of a problem intensify other, neglected aspects. The history of pollution
control in the United States offers an example. Our federal environmental
statutes have focused on one medium at a time: separate laws for air, water, and
land. Restrictions on one medium have induced disposal into other media.7 Like
squeezing one end of a balloon, this approach shifts the problems elsewhere and
delays attainment of the primary goal: a cleaner environment. An integrated
approach would control pollution more comprehensively and effectively.8
Similarly, focusing solely on energy sector CO2 would induce perverse shifts
in emissions. For example, controlling energy sector CO2 alone would invite
fuel switching from coal to natural gas because burning coal emits about twice
as much CO2 per unit of energy produced as does natural gas. But natural gas
is almost pure methane (CH4), and methane is roughly 20 times more potent
than CO2 per mass at causing global warming. As little as 6 percent fugitive
methane emissions from natural gas systems would be enough to fully offset the
CO2-related benefits of this fuel switching.
9 In the United States, natural gas
systems rarely release more than 2 percent of their methane, but in Europe the
methane leakage rate has been much higher, often exceeding 6 percent, espe-
cially in Russia, where much of the natural gas to replace European coal would
come from. Thus a CO2-only policy in Europe could yield a net increase in the
contribution to global warming.10
Another example involves replacing fossil fuels with biomass fuels, such as
ethanol made from corn. At first glance such a policy seems attractive because it
would reduce energy sector CO2 emissions. The CO2 emissions from burning
the fossil fuels would be reduced or eliminated, and the CO2 emissions from
burning the biomass fuels would, one might presume, be at least partly offset by
the sequestration of that same CO2 from the atmosphere by the corn as it grew.
But the story is not that simple. Focusing only on energy sector CO2 neglects
three important emission categories. First, the CO2 emissions from the ancillary
agricultural operations needed to farm the corn, manufacture fertilizer, irrigate
the land, and convert the corn into fuel probably would be large.11 Second,
growing corn uses large quantities of nitrogen fertilizer, which release nitrous
oxide (N2O), a GHG almost 300 times more potent per mass than CO2. Third,
if the corn is grown on cleared forest lands, the carbon liberated from the forest
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ecosystem (trees, plants, and soils) when cleared and the lesser ability of the corn
field to sequester carbon as compared to the forest must be counted as well.
Together, these three side effects could make biomass fuel much less attractive,
and possibly even perverse, as a climate protection strategy.
The solution to these perverse shifts is not to abandon climate protection but
to include all the major GHGs (including methane and nitrous oxide, and oth-
ers, as well as CO2) and all sectors (including agriculture and forests as well as
energy). A comprehensive approach defines performance and measures results in
terms of the full impacts of any policy intervention on climate change, thus pre-
venting perverse shifts across GHGs and sectors.
A comprehensive approach would also give sources the incentive to find ways
to reduce all of these GHGs in all sectors. For example, under a comprehensive
regulatory design, Russia and other countries with leaky natural gas systems
would have a greater incentive to invest in closing methane leaks. And sources
would invest in conserving and expanding forests to sequester carbon, poten-
tially aiding biodiversity as well as climate protection.12
Economic Advantages
There are also economic advantages associated with the comprehensive
approach. Allowing a wider array of control options reduces the cost of
achieving the overall objective. By allowing countries to choose which GHGs
they reduce in which sectors, the comprehensive approach gives them the
opportunity to make the most cost-effective reductions. Because there is so
much variety in GHG limitation opportunities across nations, the compre-
hensive approach would yield large cost savings compared with a piecemeal
approach that fixes limits for CO2 alone or for each gas separately. A com-
prehensive approach would regulate the net CO2-equivalent emissions from
each country, not the specifics of how it was achieved, thereby protecting the
climate at lower cost. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated
that meeting a U.S. emission target of 20 percent below 1990 levels by the
year 2010 by comprehensively addressing all GHGs, instead of just energy
sector CO2 alone, would reduce costs by 75 percent; adding the option of
sink enhancement would cost 90 percent less than the energy sector CO2 pol-
icy.13 Similarly, a World Bank study found that India could reduce its costs
80 percent by controlling all GHGs instead of energy sector CO2 alone.
14
The most recent and thorough study confirms these results worldwide. Using
an integrated assessment model of the world economy, a research team at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that a comprehensive
approach to all GHGs and sectors reduces the global costs of meeting the
Kyoto Protocol targets by at least 60 percent.15 The MIT study also noted
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that the multigas approach could be more effective at protecting the climate
than the CO2-only approach, both because the relative global warming
impact of the non-CO2 gases is expected to increase in the future and because
the ability of CO2 to fertilize plant growth and hence stimulate carbon stor-
age means that CO2 creates a negative feedback on global warming that the
other gases do not. A new study by National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) climate scientist James Hansen and colleagues offers further
support for the comprehensive approach, showing that control of non-CO2
GHGs (including methane and dark soot) would be cost-effective and would
yield significant side benefits to human health by reducing local air pollu-
tants.16
Innovation
By rewarding efforts in a wider array of gases and sectors, the comprehensive
approach also provides better incentives for innovation in abatement strategies.
Focusing narrowly on a specific sector or gas misses the chance to stimulate new
approaches that have not yet been identified. The comprehensive approach also
offers the flexibility to change tactics as our understanding of technologies and
climate impacts evolves.
Fairness
The comprehensive approach establishes a more equitable position for all
nations at the regulatory negotiation table. Because of the differences across
countries in opportunities to control sources and expand sinks and differences
in their economic status, a piecemeal policy inevitably favors some nations while
disproportionately burdening others. The comprehensive approach allows each
country to choose its best mix of policies, dealing more even-handedly with
countries of widely different internal economic and social configurations.
Participation
The cost and fairness advantages of the comprehensive approach have another
benefit. As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, attracting par-
ticipation in international climate policy by a large number of countries is crit-
ical. Because climate change and regulatory actions to address it affect each
nation differently, their own best policy responses will vary. No single, narrow
regulatory tactic will be attractive to all of the world’s countries; flexible
approaches will have wider appeal. Policy instruments that are less costly, indi-
vidually and collectively, will stand a greater chance of being acceptable to all
parties and attracting their participation in the treaty.
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Progress on the Comprehensive Approach
The climate treaties have made progress in adopting the comprehensive
approach to addressing all major GHGs in all sectors, and including sinks as
well as sources. The United States proposed the comprehensive approach in
1990,17 and that approach was adopted in the Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (FCCC) signed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Article 3 of the
FCCC endorses the comprehensive approach, and Article 4 states that parties
shall reduce emissions of all GHGs and enhance GHG sinks.
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, maintained the comprehensive
approach. It specifically included six GHG classes in its quantitative emission
targets: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluo-
rocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). It also gives credit for sink
expansion. The Kyoto Protocol requires countries to attain levels of net GHG
emission reductions, weighted by the Global Warming Potential (GWP) index
according to their relative contribution to global warming, and does not specify
separate limitations for each gas. This comprehensive approach offers each coun-
try the flexibility to reduce the sum of its GHG emissions in the most cost-effec-
tive way it chooses while requiring countries to monitor and manage all the
salient GHGs. The Bonn and Marrakech accords on implementing Kyoto rein-
forced the comprehensive approach in almost all respects, although they did
impose quantitative ceilings on the use of sinks by each country. These limits
may increase the costs of achieving the Kyoto targets.
Concerns have been raised about the administrative practicality of a multi-
gas approach, including that emissions of some gases might be difficult to mon-
itor and that the GWP index used to compare the heat-trapping ability of the
different GHGs is imperfect. Some critics proposed that a narrow regulatory
mechanism (addressing only CO2) be devised initially and then expanded step-
wise into a more comprehensive instrument (addressing multiple GHGs) later
on. But this strategy is flawed. First, it would initially forfeit the environmental
and economic advantages of the comprehensive approach: It would invite 
perverse shifts, and it would cost much more. These benefits of comprehensive-
ness vastly outweigh its administrative costs. Second, the intended stepwise
expansion probably would be delayed or thwarted: The countries and interest
groups least burdened by the initial narrow design would become entrenched in
their favored positions and would resist expansion to a more comprehensive
approach later. Third, this piecemeal strategy would fail to provide the incen-
tives for innovation in the monitoring and abatement methods for non-CO2
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gases that eventually would be needed to run an effective comprehensive pro-
gram. Moreover, the comprehensive approach is not impractical.18 The meas-
urement of non-CO2 gases and nonenergy sectors, even if initially difficult,
would improve in response to policy incentives. And such measurement is nec-
essary even under a CO2-only policy if we are to evaluate the true effectiveness
of the policy in protecting the climate; ignoring the non-CO2 gases does not
make them go away. The GWP index is not perfect, but it is more accurate than
ignoring the non-CO2 gases (implicitly assigning them an index weight of zero).
The treaties expressly contemplate improving the GWP index over time in
response to new science. In sum, the comprehensive approach is a practical and
advantageous design for effective and efficient climate policy.
Spatial Complexity, Participation, 
and Instrument Choice19
GHG emissions could be regulated in several ways, such as technology require-
ments, emission taxes, subsidies for abatement, maximum emission levels, or
tradable emission allowances. This question of instrument choice has long been
a central theme of environmental law, policy, and economics. And it has taken
center stage in the international negotiations on the FCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol (and the 2001 Bonn/Marrakech accord on implementing Kyoto). The
FCCC adopted an informal version of allowance trading called joint imple-
mentation (JI) (Article 4(2)(a)). The Kyoto Protocol retained JI (Article 6) and
added a formal system of tradable allowances (Article 17) as well as a new infor-
mal trading system for the sale of emission reduction credits by developing
countries, called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article 12). Were
these the best choices? The answer relates to the spatial complexity of global cli-
mate, global economic activity, and global regulation.
Spatial Complexity
Global Impacts
A primary challenge of global environmental problems is that they have global
impacts. Each country’s GHG emissions create global environmental spillover
effects, or externalities.20 The atmosphere is being treated as an open-access
commons that anyone can use as a disposal site for GHGs.21 Prevention of these
global externalities (i.e., climate protection) is a global public good because it is
nonexcludable: Once an improved climate is provided, it is impossible to
exclude anyone from enjoying its benefits; abatement of emissions at any one
location generates benefits enjoyed by people around the world. As a result, any
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individual country is likely to receive only a small fraction of the benefits of its
own abatement efforts.
If GHG abatement is costly, countries will prefer to avoid the costs of
abatement while enjoying the shared benefit of others’ efforts, trying to take a
free ride on others’ abatement.22 Collective abatement action would bring
greater net gains to all the participants, but fear of free riding by others can lead
each country to hesitate to act. Thus, the global nature of the climate problem
means that individual countries will tend to invest in less abatement than would
be desirable from a collective global point of view. A central challenge for global
regulatory design is to choose instruments that help overcome free riding and
facilitate collective action.23
Global Sources
Overcoming free riding in the provision of public goods is never easy, even at
the local level, but doing so in the global context is even more difficult. The
sources of GHG emissions are spread all around the planet, so climate policy
must have nearly global coverage to be effective. The U.S. and China are the
world’s top emitters, and developing countries are expected to increase their
GHG-emitting activities rapidly over the next few decades.24 A spatially limited
policy that covers only industrialized countries, or omits China and the U.S.,
would omit a major fraction of global emissions and fail to forestall adverse cli-
mate change.
Worse, a policy that restricts emissions only in some countries could induce
emission sources to shift or “leak” to unregulated countries through both indus-
try relocation and changing world commodity prices. Such leakage has several
undesirable consequences. First, it at least partly offsets the environmental effec-
tiveness of the policy. Second, the economies of the initially unregulated nations
receiving the leakage become more GHG-intensive as a result of the leakage so
that later participation in the regulatory treaty becomes even more costly and
unappealing to them.25 Third, even if actual leakage is small, fear of leakage can
be a potent political obstacle to treaty participation. For example, in 1997 the
U.S. Senate voted 95–0 not to ratify a climate treaty that exempted the devel-
oping countries.26
Local Diversity
A further complexity is that sources and impacts vary widely around the world.
There is significant local diversity in the costs and benefits of abatement and in
social and legal systems. The costs of abatement vary because differences in tech-
nology, available substitutes, and economic structures make avoiding future
emissions much less (or more) costly in some places than others. One study
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found a 50-fold difference in GHG abatement costs just within the membership
of the European Union (EU).27 The range of variation in global abatement costs
is likely to be even greater than that.
Meanwhile, the benefits of preventing global environmental change also
vary. Even though climate protection is a global public good, its benefits would
vary regionally. Island nations and countries with low-lying coastal areas are at
greater risk from sea level rise and so stand to see greater benefits from averting
global warming. Wind and precipitation patterns may change so that some areas
will experience drier weather and others wetter weather. Host ranges for vegeta-
tion and pests may shift. Poorer countries with agrarian or coastal economies
and little social safety net may be physically more vulnerable to these changing
patterns than are wealthier countries. But wealthier countries, even if physically
less vulnerable to climate change, typically place a higher priority on long-term
global environmental protection than do poorer countries for whom more local
and more immediate problems—such as hunger and infectious disease—are
more pressing. Thus, with the exception of poor island and coastal nations, it is
largely the wealthier countries that press for long-term climate protection.28
Some countries, perhaps including China and Russia, might even believe
they stand to gain from climate change, on the view that they will enjoy greater
agricultural yields in currently cold areas if temperatures rise. A recent synthesis
of global climate change impacts on key end points—agriculture, forestry, water
resources, energy consumption, sea level rise, ecosystems, and human health—
indicates that some initial warming (1°C) and CO2 fertilization may help agri-
culture and human health in some areas (including the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Russia, and China), for a
near-term gain of 1–3 percent of GDP. However, this climate change will have
adverse impacts in poorer areas (especially Africa and southeast Asia, which
would lose 1–4 percent of GDP), and the impacts of greater warming will
become adverse worldwide over the longer term, including losses of 1–2 percent
in OECD countries and 4–9 percent in Russia and developing countries (but
not in China, which exhibits persistent gains from climate change of about 2
percent of GDP).29 Therefore, China and perhaps Russia (initially) may not just
be free riders (players for whom cooperative action is beneficial but who would
rather let others bear the cost) but may be “cooperative losers”: players for whom
climate change is benign (or not seriously adverse) and for whom cooperative
action to prevent climate change is costly and who therefore dislike cooperative
prevention efforts.30 Because these countries are also large GHG emitters, suc-
cessful climate regulation must include these countries. But attracting participa-
tion by cooperative losers is even more difficult than overcoming free riding.
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Participation and Voting Rules
This spatial complexity would not make so much difference in the choice of reg-
ulatory instrument if global regulation could simply be imposed on all emitters
worldwide by one rational benevolent dictator. That imaginary world of welfare-
maximizing despotism is the dream of some, the nightmare of others, and the
routine assumption of most economic models of regulation.31
In reality, the voting rule for policy adoption ranges along a spectrum from
rule by one (autocracy) to rule by all (unanimity). In autocracy, a single decision
maker makes the law, and all are bound regardless of their consent. In democ-
racies, legislation embodies a version of majority rule: A majority of consent is
sufficient to adopt a law that then binds all, including those (up to 49 percent)
who dissented from the adoption of this law.32 By contrast, the voting rule for
international treaties is consent: Treaties bind only those who agree to be
bound.33 Unlike autocracy and majority rule, under the consent voting rule reg-
ulation cannot be imposed on dissenters. Note that consent is not quite the
same as unanimity. The latter requires the consent of every voter for a law to
become binding on any voter, whereas the former does not. Under consent, the
law is binding on those who do consent, even if others demur. Under unanim-
ity, each voter can veto the entire law; under consent, each voter can only choose
not to participate herself.
In practice, the real international voting rule for global climate treaties is
consent,34 tinged with aspects of both coercion and unanimity. Overlaid on the
basic rule of consent to treaties are some coercive pressures, such as military
force and trade sanctions.35 But military force is rarely used to secure adoption
of environmental treaties (although disputes over fisheries have recently come
close to naval combat), and the use of trade sanctions to penalize treaty non-
participants may be limited by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) free trade disciplines. Sham-
ing36 and interest group pressures37 are elements of a country’s calculus of
whether to consent. Meanwhile, the tradition of seeking consensus in treaty
negotiations38 and the need to avoid emission leakage by covering all major
players tend to place the consent-based voting rule for international climate
treaties fairly near to the unanimity end of the spectrum.
The voting rule of consent has fundamental implications for participation
and, in turn, for the choice among regulatory instruments.39 In general, national
consent to a treaty requires a positive national net benefit compared to not join-
ing.40 Unless a country views joining a treaty as favoring its interests, it is highly
unlikely to join. Of course, net benefit and interest are to be construed broadly,
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including considerations of fairness and reputation as well as economic, envi-
ronmental, social, political, and other concerns. In economic terms, treaties
must satisfy not just Kaldor–Hicks efficiency (aggregate net benefits) but also
the more stringent test of actual Pareto improvement (individual net benefits for
each participant).41 International treaties thus are adopted by a voting rule
much more analogous to marketplace contracts than to national legislation.42
And this consent voting rule, together with the problems of free riders, leakage,
and cooperative losers, makes collective action more difficult to organize than
under coercive voting rules such as majority rule.
Global Instrument Choice
Most analyses of regulation assume autocracy: If one rational person could pick
the best regulatory instrument, which would she choose? This section begins by
reviewing the analysis under autocracy and then examines how this choice is dif-
ferent when the voting rule is consent.
The Regulator’s Toolbox
The instruments available to the regulator include technology requirements,
emission taxes, subsidies for abatement, performance standards, and tradable
emission allowances. A broad distinction can be drawn between basing regula-
tion on conduct and basing it on outcomes.
Conduct-based instruments specify how firms shall act, in the hope that
improved conduct will reduce pollution. For example, a conduct-based instru-
ment might dictate specific technologies that firms must install or specific fuels
that firms must use to limit emissions. In contrast, outcome-based instruments
(also called incentive-based) seek to achieve a certain degree of environmental
protection but allow firms to choose how they will meet that goal. They inter-
nalize externalities by “reconstituting” flawed markets, using incentives that
motivate firms to adjust their own behavior by taking account of the environ-
mental impacts they had previously neglected.43 Two basic types of incentive-
based instruments are price-based and quantity-based.44 Price-based instru-
ments set a price for emitting, and firms then decide what quantity of emissions
to generate in light of having to pay this price. Price-based instruments include
taxes on emissions and subsidies for abatement. Quantity-based instruments set
a total quantity of acceptable emissions and then allocate entitlements to emit.
Quantity-based instruments include fixed performance standards (i.e., an emis-
sion limit for each source) and tradable emission allowances (i.e., emission lim-
its for each source, which sources can buy or sell). Once the total quantity of
emissions is chosen and allowances adding up to that total are assigned (or once
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an emission tax is set), each source then decides how much to emit in light of
having to buy an additional allowance (or pay the tax) and in light of the oppor-
tunity to earn the market price to sell an extra allowance.
The Analysis Under Autocracy
There is no universal best regulatory instrument; the choice among them
depends on several contextual factors, including their environmental effective-
ness and their cost in achieving any given level of protection.45 Still, under the
standard assumption of autocracy—that the law is imposed by a single rational
actor—three presumptions have emerged in the literature on instrument choice.
These three presumptions are that incentive instruments are superior to conduct
instruments, taxes and tradable allowances are superior to subsidies for abate-
ment, and taxes often are superior to tradable allowances. After briefly describ-
ing these presumptions in the world of autocracy, we can examine their validity
in a world of consent.
INCENTIVES VERSUS CONDUCT
First, incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradable allowances gener-
ally are more cost-effective than conduct instruments or fixed performance stan-
dards. Uniform standards require all firms to do the same thing regardless of
cost. If abatement costs vary across sources—as they do for GHGs—then cost-
effectiveness can be improved by using a regulatory mechanism that obtains
more abatement from the lower-cost abaters. Both emission taxes and tradable
allowances achieve overall environmental protection at lower total cost by induc-
ing lower-cost firms to abate more and higher-cost firms to abate less. In the
United States, allowance trading programs have proven to be far more cost-effec-
tive than conduct rules or fixed performance standards, cutting costs by roughly
half.46 For example, the SO2 emission trading system adopted in the 1990 Clean
Air Act amendments to reduce acid rain has achieved a dramatic reduction in
SO2 emissions at roughly half the cost of the prior uniform approach.
47 Because
GHG abatement costs vary a great deal across countries, the cost savings for
global GHG emission trading (compared with fixed national targets) are pre-
dicted to be large (30 to 70 percent).48
Second, incentive instruments are more effective in stimulating dynamic
innovation. Technology requirements provide no incentive for the firm to invest
in improved abatement methods beyond what has been mandated. Performance
standards provide a modest incentive for innovation. Taxes and trading give
sources the strongest continuous motivation to improve abatement methods,
which enables the source to sell allowances or pay lower taxes.49
Third, incentive instruments need not involve undue administrative costs.
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Technology standards require detailed engineering choices and monitoring of
devices installed. Incentive methods must determine the tax rate or number of
allowances and monitor actual emissions. Monitoring emissions can be costly
(especially for dispersed sources), but monitoring the technology in place at a
source does not measure environmental impact. Monitoring actual emissions
can be worthwhile if it improves environmental effectiveness. Moreover, the
social cost savings and enhanced innovation under incentive instruments would
often dwarf their administrative costs.
Fourth, incentive instruments can be designed to promote fairness. There is
concern that efficiency-enhancing policies (such as emission trading) might be
unfair to poorer communities and developing countries.50 Developing countries
worry that global environmental law may be a form of eco-imperialism. They
want developed countries to take the lead in controlling GHG emissions. It
would be unfair to make poorer countries worse off in the effort to correct a
problem caused by and of primary concern to wealthier industrialized countries.
Technology standards, performance standards, and emission taxes could be
regressive. But global tradable allowances could be structured to achieve fairness
for poorer societies by giving them valuable headroom in their initial assignment
of allowances. This would enable poorer countries to grow economically by
emitting somewhat more GHGs (perhaps up to or even over their business-as-
usual forecast) or by earning substantial revenues from selling a valuable new
asset—the tradable allowances—to wealthier sources facing higher abatement
costs. This system would benefit poorer societies by giving them a substantial
revenue stream.51 It would also oblige richer countries to take the lead by financ-
ing global emission reductions (in a way that is also cost saving). The basic logic
of voluntary exchange (market trading) means that allowance sales would not
occur unless both parties felt better off. On the other hand, insisting that indus-
trialized countries control their emissions entirely at home would be unfair to
developing countries because it would deprive developing countries of the
allowance sale revenue stream. It would be like insisting that rich people must
spend their money only in rich neighborhoods.
Fifth, incentive mechanisms do not represent immoral means of achieving
environmental protection. Critics worry that translating environmental protec-
tion into market prices and commodities may debase its moral value.52 But inso-
far as environmental degradation stems from the failure of markets to take
account of environmental impacts, the problem is not that the environment is
too important to leave to markets but rather that the environment is too impor-
tant to leave out of markets. Nor do tradable allowances amount to a special
“license to pollute.” Conduct instruments and fixed performance standards
amount to a license to pollute for free once the technology has been installed or
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the performance standard achieved. Taxes and tradable emission allowances, by
contrast, force the source to pay for every unit of emissions, either by paying the
tax or by foregoing the revenue from the sale of the allowance. Furthermore, if
causing additional pollution is the immoral act and if incentive instruments are
more cost-effective and innovation-enhancing, then the moralist who opposes
incentive instruments is committing an immoral act.
TAXES AND TRADING VERSUS SUBSIDIES
The second presumption is that subsidies for abatement are inefficient. Subsi-
dies for abatement can act like emission taxes at the margin: For each source,
declining to abate means forfeiting the subsidy, which is equivalent to paying a
tax of the same amount. But whereas taxes also charge the source for all its
unabated emissions and thereby raise the average cost of doing business in that
industry, subsidies pay the source for abatement and thereby reduce the average
cost of doing business in that industry. This attracts investment to the emitting
sector and could increase total emissions even if the subsidy reduced emissions
at individual plants.53 The subsidy payment may be seen as insurance against the
social cost of the emitting activity and thus lead to its increase.54 Sources may
also increase pollution to secure larger subsidies for abatement.55
TAXES VERSUS TRADING
The third presumption of the standard analysis is that taxes are preferred to trad-
able allowances. In theory, these instruments can produce identical results. Taxes
set the price of emitting and allow the quantity of emissions to vary, whereas
allowances set the aggregate quantity of emissions and allow the price of emit-
ting to vary. If the actor adopting these instruments (our assumed rational auto-
crat) knows firms’ costs with certainty, she can use either instrument to achieve
the same result: If she issues Q allowances, the market price P for each allowance
to emit 1 ton of pollutant will be equal to the tax of P that she would set to
achieve the same Q amount of emissions.
But if the decision maker is uncertain about firms’ costs, then these instru-
ments diverge. A tax set at P might achieve Q emissions, but if firms’ true costs
are higher than expected, this tax will yield more than Q emissions (firms will
pay the tax rather than abate). Issuing Q allowances might achieve a market
price of P for each allowance, but if firms’ true costs are higher than expected,
this policy will yield a higher price for allowances. Thus the tax prevents cost
escalation (firms will not pay more than the tax) but lets emissions vary, whereas
the allowance system prevents emission escalation (there is a finite number of
allowances) but lets costs vary. Under uncertainty, the choice between these
instruments depends on one’s relative concern about cost escalation versus 
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emission escalation (i.e., on the relative steepness of the marginal cost of abate-
ment versus the marginal benefit of abatement).56 One study found that, given
significant uncertainty about true abatement costs and assuming a very flat mar-
ginal benefit curve (i.e., assuming that escalating emissions would have only very
gradual impact on the damages from climate change), a GHG tax would yield
roughly five times greater net benefits than would a system of tradable emission
allowances.57
Tax regimes and auctioning allowances also have the advantage of raising rev-
enues that can be used to reduce previously existing taxes. Often, these preex-
isting taxes act as a disincentive to something good, such as labor or investment.
Revenue-raising GHG abatement policies can also reduce those distortionary
taxes, yielding a “double-dividend.”58
A system of tradable allowances, like any market, also faces other challenges.
One is market power: A few large allowance sellers (e.g., Russia or China) could
try to charge excessive monopoly prices.59 This is a particularly knotty problem
at the international level, where there is no antitrust law. Another problem for a
GHG allowance market is transaction costs.60 The costs of finding trading part-
ners, negotiating deals, monitoring and enforcing performance, and insuring
against nonperformance can hinder efficient transactions. Formal allowance
trading seeks to reduce transaction costs by making allowances fungible and fos-
tering risk diversification and market transparency. But informal allowance trad-
ing such as JI and the CDM may face high transaction costs.
Taxes, however, face their own difficulties. First, if emission escalation is a
more serious concern than cost escalation (the converse of the assumption
described earlier), then allowances are superior to taxes under uncertainty.61 Sec-
ond, whereas allowance markets can face market power and transaction costs,
taxes can face high administrative costs to calculate and collect the tax and to
audit and enforce against taxpayers. Third, raising revenue may become more
important to tax officials than the environmental purpose of the tax, leading
them to set the tax too low to discourage GHG emissions. Fourth, there is the
question of which country, countries, or organization would collect GHG taxes
and distribute tax revenues, a particularly sensitive issue on the international
front. Fifth, as discussed earlier, GHG taxes could be unfairly regressive to
poorer countries. Sixth, as discussed below, under the consent voting rule taxes
may not attract adequate participation by countries.
The Analysis Under Consent
The foregoing assumes autocracy. As discussed earlier, real global regulation
occurs under a voting rule of consent: No country can be bound to a treaty
except by its agreement, which in turn depends on its perceived national net
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benefit. Basing global instrument choice on the assumption of autocracy may
therefore lead to serious errors.
At the international level, participation must be attracted, not coerced. Free
riding must be overcome. Cooperative losers (countries that perceive a national
net cost from preventing global warming) must be persuaded to participate by
some inducement other than global environmental protection itself, such as side
payments sufficient to overcome their foregone gains from warming plus their
abatement costs.62
PARTICIPATION EFFICIENCY
Attracting participation yields benefits but can be costly. The benefits of partic-
ipation include greater coverage of globally dispersed emissions, reduced free
riding, reduced cross-border emission leakage, and a wider array of abatement
opportunities. The costs of securing participation include the out-of-pocket
costs of side payments and the perverse incentives of subsidizing abatement (dis-
cussed earlier).63 The best regulatory instrument under consent must therefore
strive to satisfy a criterion that is not relevant under autocracy: “participation
efficiency.”64 Participation efficiency is the ability to attract participation at least
cost. The most participation-efficient regulatory instrument would minimize
the sum of the costs of nonparticipation plus the costs of securing participation.
Equivalently, it would maximize the difference between the benefits of securing
participation and the costs of securing participation.
The less coercive the voting rule, the more participation efficiency matters in
selecting among regulatory instruments. Under majority rule, some participa-
tion-efficient inducements are needed to gain the majority needed to adopt a
law. After that, coercive power exists over remaining dissenters. Under consent,
every important cooperative loser must be paid to play.
COMPARING INSTRUMENTS
Under autocracy, as discussed above, the standard conclusion is that taxes are the
superior instrument. But under consent, the relative merits of alternative regu-
latory instruments depend significantly on their participation efficiency.
First, direct subsidies for abatement, in the form of a cash payment to non-
beneficiary countries, would be one way to provide the compensation needed to
attract participation.65 Unfortunately, subsidies for abatement generate perverse
incentives for increased aggregate emissions.66 There is also the possibility that
some countries would posture as cooperative losers to demand side payments via
threatened or actual increases in GHG emissions, potentially decreasing the
degree of cooperation enough to result in higher total emissions.67
Second, participation might be coerced through threats of trade sanctions.68
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Loss of trading partners could induce free riders and even cooperative losers to
participate because of the fear that noncooperation would be more costly than
cooperation.69 Although this approach avoids the perverse incentive problem of
subsidies, several other problems would arise. Threats of trade sanctions may not
be credible because they would impose high costs on both sides of the trade bar-
riers. Trade sanctions may also distort trade, impair global economic efficiency,
and spur a retaliatory trade war. Trade sanctions often are ineffective because
they strengthen the target government’s domestic political case for resistance to
foreign meddling.70 Trade sanctions can also injure the target country’s economy
so much that compliance would become more difficult or impossible, thwarting
the goal of inducing environmental protection.71 Finally, trade sanctions
imposed by wealthy countries against poorer countries cut against principles of
fairness.72
Third, GHG taxes might be used. But because taxes impose the highest costs
on sources, they probably will induce the greatest rate of nonparticipation.
GHG taxes probably would attract the fewest cooperative losers, leading to sig-
nificant leakage and a failure to reduce global emissions. Perhaps a tax paired
with side payments could succeed. But to attract participation, the side pay-
ments would have to be large enough to ensure positive national net benefits,
compensating for abatement costs, foregone environmental benefits to coopera-
tive losers, and the burden of the tax on residual unabated emissions. Such a side
payment would undercut the ability of the tax to reduce emissions in recipient
countries. The side payment could not be a “lump sum” (a single one-time pay-
ment unrelated to the country’s marginal costs) because the side payment would
have to repay the country for every incremental dollar of burden incurred as a
result of the tax, or else the policy would not be attractive on net (Pareto improv-
ing) to the recipient country and would not attract the country’s participation.
Fourth, one could use quantity-based instruments. Fixed-quantity targets
(performance standards) for each country, on their own, would incur high non-
participation costs. Large and growing cooperative losers would simply decline
to be bound. This has been the predictable experience under the FCCC and
Kyoto Protocol: Large and growing developing countries, including China,
India, and Brazil, have declined to adopt quantitative emission limitations.
Coupling fixed quantity targets with a direct payment to cooperative losers
could help secure those countries’ participation. This was the approach taken in
the Montreal Protocol to phase out CFCs: Its Multilateral Fund was created to
secure participation by China and India. Such side payments would still gener-
ate perverse incentives, but now—in contrast to the cases of direct subsidies and
taxes plus side payments—the fixed-quantity limits would constrain the per-
verse incentives from increasing aggregate emissions. This is a distinct advantage
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of quantity limits over taxes under the consent voting rule, where side payments
are necessary.
But fixed-quantity limits would not be cost-effective because they would not
allow emission reductions to be accomplished wherever abatement costs are low-
est. An even better design for quantity-based instruments would be to use trad-
able allowances, reducing costs dramatically. The side payments could then be
embedded in the allowance trading system itself. In this “cap-and-trade” system,
poorer countries with large emissions such as Russia, China, India, and Brazil
would be assigned extra allowances as a side payment to attract their participa-
tion. These headroom allowances would be a new asset that poorer countries
could sell to earn profits in the allowance trading market. Wealthier countries
would thereby finance abatement (and a lower-GHG economic growth path) in
poorer countries by buying headroom allowances. This cap-and-trade system
would attract participation through in-kind side payments while constraining
the perverse incentives of those side payments by securing the adoption of quan-
tity caps on participating countries.73 This was the strategy used in the Kyoto
Protocol to engage Russia’s participation: Russia was assigned headroom
allowances in exchange for its agreement to join the treaty. Without these extra
allowances, Russia might well have stayed out of the treaty, impairing its effec-
tiveness. This approach might also be used to attract participation by China and
other major developing countries.
A critical step in this cap-and-trade approach is the initial allocation of 
emission allowances. Of course, the negotiations will be difficult, as with any
burden-sharing negotiation. Some critics have asserted that negotiating the
assignment of GHG emission allowances would be so difficult that the system
would never get off the ground.74 But this concern applies to any regulatory
instrument because all forms of regulation impose varying burdens on those reg-
ulated and because all forms of regulation under the consent voting rule entail
a burden-sharing negotiation. The real question is the relative difficulty of nego-
tiating the initial assignment using the alternative instruments, given the con-
sent framework.75 In that context, tradable allowances would ease the problem
of initial negotiations. As Coase taught, the lower the impediments to subse-
quent reallocations of entitlements among the parties, the less the initial assign-
ment binds.76 Technology standards, fixed quantity limits, and taxes provide no
flexibility for subsequent reallocations of entitlements. But allowance trading
makes postagreement reallocations possible, thereby reducing the initial assign-
ment impasse.
To summarize, under the voting rule of consent that governs global climate
treaties, participation efficiency is crucial. A way must be found to pay reluctant
sources to participate while also inhibiting the perverse incentives that these pay-
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ments create. The best instrument for achieving this result is a system of inter-
national tradable emission allowances, with headroom allowances allocated to
cooperative losers. It secures broad participation and enables cost-effective flex-
ibility in the spatial location of abatement but caps total emissions and thereby
constrains the perverse environmental effects of subsidizing abatement.
Compliance
Compliance is a general problem of any regulatory system. But it figures promi-
nently in criticisms of international environmental regulation because it is more
troublesome under the consent voting rule, where countries—even after agree-
ing to participate—cannot be compelled to comply but must be attracted by the
continuing desirability of participation. Critics often charge that ensuring com-
pliance with international emission trading would be difficult. Yet the problem
of compliance is not unique to allowance trading; all regulatory instruments
require monitoring and enforcement. The key question is the relative ability of
the instruments to maintain compliance, given the voting rule of consent. The
criticisms of weak enforcement systems are really criticisms of the weak ability
of the international system to deal with any nation-states’ noncompliance with
any treaty obligations.
Noncompliance is a partial version of free riding. Once free riding is over-
come—once countries are attracted to participate by the net gains they perceive
from joining the treaty—then “compliance comes free of charge.”77 Therefore,
there are good reasons to expect allowance trading to be superior to alternative
regulatory instruments at inducing compliance. First, the improved cost-effec-
tiveness (30–70 percent lower abatement costs) under allowance trading makes
participation less costly and thus lowers the incentive to free ride or cheat. Sec-
ond, the assignment of headroom allowances attracts participation by erstwhile
noncooperators, and the prospect of continuing to sell allowances over time
provides a strong disincentive to cheat. Third, a system of allowance trading fur-
nishes useful enforcement tools, including the ability to debit a violator’s
allowance account and to exclude the violator from the allowance market.
Fourth, a tradable allowance system is likely to nurture domestic political con-
stituencies—allowance sellers, allowance buyers, abatement investors, brokers,
and environmentalists—who would pressure their governments to comply with
emission limits so as not to have their allowances devalued or their market access
hindered.78
Meanwhile, the actual effectiveness of internationally agreed GHG taxes or
technology standards would be extremely difficult to ensure. In response to a
GHG tax or technology standard, countries would have strong incentives to
adjust their internal tax and subsidy policies to counteract the effect of the inter-
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national policy on domestic industries. This “fiscal cushioning” would under-
mine the effect of the tax or technology standard on actual emissions.79 Thus, a
country could be in technical compliance with the tax or technology standard,
but its fiscal cushioning countermoves could vitiate the environmental effec-
tiveness of these instruments. It would be difficult for international authorities
to detect and block these detailed domestic fiscal games. By contrast, the effec-
tiveness of international allowance trading would be simpler to monitor. Under
a quantity instrument, participants need not monitor all the domestic tactics
being practiced in each country. Instead, they need only monitor the nation’s
aggregate emissions and compare them with the country’s allowed total (its cap
or allowance holdings). This real environmental effectiveness—as opposed to
apparent compliance—would be easier to monitor than would the intricacies of
domestic implementation under a global tax or technology standard.
Assessing the Kyoto Protocol
In terms of spatial complexity and participation efficiency, the Kyoto Protocol
gets things about half right. On the bright side, it adopts a quantity constraint
on emissions, eschewing technology standards and emission taxes, and it author-
izes emission trading (in Article 17) to enhance cost-effectiveness rather than
adopting fixed performance standards. Moreover, it makes some use of
allowance allocations to secure participation. It allocates the burden of emission
reductions among nations roughly in proportion to national wealth, which as
discussed earlier is a rough proxy for national perceived benefits of climate pro-
tection. And it assigns headroom allowances to Russia—a move that some
observers have criticized as ineptitude and dubbed “hot air” but can be better
understood as a very rational and necessary form of compensation to secure Rus-
sia’s participation in the treaty. Russia’s agreement to emission controls was by
no means guaranteed, and without headroom allowances it might well have
stayed out of the treaty, squandering many low-cost abatement options and
inviting significant leakage.
But this cap-and-trade regime is only a half-step in the right direction
because the Kyoto Protocol omits the developing countries from this regime.
China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and other developing countries have no obliga-
tions to limit their emissions under the treaty. Their growing emissions will ren-
der the treaty increasingly ineffective. The prospects for emission leakage from
capped industrialized countries to uncapped developing countries are serious.
Under the consent voting rule (and also for reasons of distributional fairness),
side payments will be needed to attract their participation.
The Kyoto Protocol tries to address developing country abatement by intro-
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ducing a new and well-intentioned device—the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) created in Article 12—through which industrialized country
sources could purchase emission reduction credits from developing countries.
The CDM does promise significant abatement at low cost and the possibility of
introducing lower-emitting technologies into developing countries before they
become dependent on high-emission growth paths. These are important advan-
tages.
But the CDM could have a perverse impact on global emissions and could
undermine future efforts to bring developing countries into the cap-and-trade
regime. First, because CDM seller countries are not subject to national quantity
caps, the CDM transactions amount to pure subsidies for abatement. As dis-
cussed earlier, this regulatory instrument is disfavored because it induces per-
verse increases in the total size of the emitting sector. By reducing the relative
cost of operating emitting enterprises in developing countries, the CDM will
attract investment to those industries (accelerate leakage) and thus could be of
limited effectiveness or even expand total emissions. (Moreover, because there
are no national quantity caps on developing countries, CDM abatement invest-
ments might be offset by unseen increases in emissions elsewhere in the same
country.)
Second, the opportunity to sell CDM credits could discourage uncapped
developing countries from joining the cap regime. Recall that it is the
prospect of selling headroom allowances that provides the pivotal incentive
for developing countries to participate in the cap-and-trade system. But if
those countries can earn just as much by selling CDM credits without a cap,
why should they accept caps? And if they don’t join the cap regime, increased
net leakage may render the entire treaty futile or worse. One way to address
this problem would be to discount CDM credits (or “certify” them at less
than the claimed tons of abatement) to reflect their lesser effectiveness in
achieving global abatement. This would lower their attractiveness and push
more countries toward agreeing to caps to take advantage of more lucrative
formal trading.80
Third, the CDM may be a battleground for political and market power. It is
constituted under Article 12 as a discrete entity governed by an executive board.
This apparently centralized organization could exert control over the market in
CDM credits.
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol makes some progress in the use of allowance trad-
ing to secure efficient participation but fails to engage developing countries in
the cap-and-trade system. For that reason the U.S. Senate announced its unan-
imous opposition to the treaty, and the Clinton administration never submitted
the treaty to the Senate for ratification. In 2001 the Bush administration
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announced that it would not pursue the Kyoto Protocol but did not propose an
alternative.
The accords reached at Bonn and Marrakech in 2001 to implement Kyoto
omitted both the developing countries and the United States, portending lim-
ited effectiveness in reducing global emissions. They also retained some restric-
tions on emission trading, including a “reserve” requirement to limit allowance
selling and quantitative limits on credit for sink expansion. The cost savings
expected from emission trading in theory must be reestimated with the actual
Bonn/Marrakech restrictions in place. To be environmentally effective (as well
as less costly), the accords should be revised to include major developing coun-
tries in a fully flexible cap-and-trade system on terms beneficial to all through
the assignment of headroom allowances.
Although the events of 2001 seemed to sacrifice broad participation, they
might set the stage for an even better result: joint accession by both the United
States and China.81 Politically the United States will not join targets without
China (as made clear by the Bush administration and by the Senate’s 95–0 vote
against joining a climate treaty that omits the major developing countries). And
China will not join targets without the United States (because it will not act
unless the wealthy industrialized countries act first). So both will have to join for
either to join. Moreover, the current parties to Kyoto will want the United States
and China to join simultaneously. If one joins without the other, it will distort
allowance prices in the emission trading market: Prices will go way up if the
United States (a large net demander) joins alone and way down if China (a large
net supplier) joins alone. The EU and Japan will not want prices to rise sharply,
and Russia will not want prices to fall sharply.
Thus, perhaps unintentionally, the initially awkward result in 2001 may pave
the way for joint accession by the United States and China. If not, the Kyoto
accord will amount to very little. Without the world’s largest emitters partici-
pating, it will not affect global emissions or concentrations much at all. Thus
joint accession by the United States and China may be the only plausible future
for the climate treaties. And this reality in turn gives the United States and
China significant leverage to negotiate for a sound global regime that improves
on Marrakech, Bonn, and Kyoto through full global emissions trading. The real
difficulty in this scenario will not be the United States; it will be China. The
United States faces both costs and benefits from joining. But China may well
perceive only costs because many forecasts of the impacts of global warming, as
noted earlier, suggest that China would on balance benefit from a warmer world.
China will have to be paid to play. The best way to compensate China for join-
ing the abatement regime will be through assignments of headroom allowances
that China can then sell, as was done in Kyoto to engage Russia.
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Temporal Complexity and Dynamic Adaptation
Perhaps the most vexing form of complexity confronting climate policy is tem-
poral: Things change over time. The environment changes, so climate change
may turn out to be more or less serious (or different in kind) than we now envi-
sion. The economy changes in ways that may ease or exacerbate abatement costs.
Temporal complexity implies two challenges: optimally allocating abatement
efforts over time and adapting climate policy as conditions and knowledge
evolve. Compared with causal and spatial complexity, temporal complexity has
received the least attention in the actual climate change treaty negotiations.
Optimal Allocation of Abatement over Time
Any given level of climate protection may be achieved with different allocations
of abatement over time. These different time paths of emission reduction will
imply different costs and benefits. Earlier reductions may protect the climate
more because they prevent the buildup of gases that would reside in the atmos-
phere for decades thereafter. But later reductions may cost less because they ease
the turnover of capital investments, allow the development of new technologies,
and spend scarce resources later rather than sooner.
One strategy to optimize abatement over time is to set emission targets not
for single years but for multiyear aggregates such as 10-year emission budgets for
each country. Such multiyear targets (or extended commitment periods) give
each country flexibility in the timing of abatement, thereby reducing the costs
of compliance because different countries may have different expectations for
the turnover of capital stock, acquisition of new technologies, and social dis-
count rates. Temporal flexibility through multiyear budgets is conceptually sim-
ilar to the spatial flexibility afforded by tradable allowances: Because abatement
costs vary across the relevant dimension (temporal or spatial), flexibility
improves cost-effectiveness. A more embracing version of temporal flexibility
would authorize banking of extra early emission reductions for application to
subsequent emission limitations, and perhaps borrowing against later limita-
tions by promising to achieve extra abatement later to make up for earlier excess
emissions. (If the climate benefits more from emission reductions achieved ear-
lier than later, then banking should earn and borrowing should be charged an
“interest rate” that renders equivalent the abatement occurring at the different
times.)
Second, targets could be announced at least 10 years in advance of their
effective dates, or take effect 10 years after the treaty enters into force. Major
investments in capital and innovation often take longer than 5 years to turn
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over, so a longer time horizon would provide early signals that enable more cost-
effective changes in technology. Targets set too close to the present will be harder
to achieve, perhaps impossible, and will invite repeated deferral in a process that
makes the initial targets lack credibility and inculcates public cynicism about the
regulatory regime. A similar cycle of unrealistic targets followed by deferral and
cynicism has characterized several major U.S. environmental laws, such as the
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act
amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990 and the best technology standards under
the Clean Water Act amendments of 1972, 1977, and 1987. On the other hand,
a downside of setting targets for many years hence is that they may fail to moti-
vate changes in businesses’ investments, and they may lack credibility because
there is so much time available to debate and revise them. Perhaps a middle
course is to set not a single target for one out-year or period but a continuous
schedule of emission limits, beginning with small or no reductions and tighten-
ing over time. This approach was successful in the lead phasedown from the
1970s through late 1980s and was approximated in the acid rain title of the
1990 Clean Air Act and the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances.
Third, the time path of emission limitations can be optimized in light of the
benefits and costs of climate protection. The FCCC states in Article 2 that its
objective is the stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level that
will avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate. (No such
level has yet been defined or agreed upon.) Such a stabilization objective can be
achieved through many different time paths of abatement, some of which are
much less costly than others. In particular, delaying abatement for several
decades and then reducing emissions more sharply can significantly reduce the
cost of stabilization by allowing for capital turnover, new technologies, and dis-
counting.82 On the other hand, if one takes account of the damages resulting
from climate change as it occurs (instead of pegging a single level at which to
stabilize concentrations), then the optimal time path of abatement is different.
Hammitt83 compares the emission reductions implied by the least-cost path to
stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at designated levels with the emis-
sion reductions implied by the optimal (net benefits maximizing) path to pre-
vent climate change (based on several assumptions about benefits and costs). He
finds that the optimal path involves more stringent near-term emission reduc-
tions below the business as usual (BAU) emission forecast than does the least-
cost path to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at 750, 650, or even 550
ppm by the period 2100–2150.84 The reason is that the optimal path takes into
account the damages from near-term emissions, whereas the least-cost path to
stabilize concentrations does not. Thus the optimal path in Hammitt’s analysis
calls for some near-term emission reductions—roughly 3 percent below BAU by
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2010, 5 percent below BAU by 2025, and 20 percent below BAU by 2100—
whereas the least-cost stabilization path for hitting 750, 650, or 550 ppm calls
for near-term emissions essentially unchanged from BAU until around 2070,
2050, and 2010, respectively, and then much steeper declines in emissions
thereafter (beginning about 2025 in the case of the 550 ppm target, for exam-
ple). The optimal path exhibits a more smoothly but slowly rising emission pro-
file that is about 2–5 percent below the least-cost stabilization profile in the near
term (through about 2025) but eventually exceeds the least-cost stabilization
emission profile after 2107, 2069, and 2024, respectively, for stabilization at
750, 650, and 550 ppm.85 Hammitt’s approach, which minimizes overall costs
(both economic and environmental), is conceptually preferable to the least-cost
stabilization strategy, which minimizes only economic costs to achieve an arbi-
trarily chosen stabilization level.86
As Hammitt notes, one would need to start building the institutional struc-
ture for climate policy some time before the dates at which emission reductions
would be expected, in order to send credible policy signals that will in turn stim-
ulate the needed shifts in investments, practices, and technologies. To achieve
Hammitt’s optimal path of 3 percent below BAU in 2010, 5 percent below BAU
in 2025, and 20 percent below BAU in 2100, one would need to begin con-
structing and implementing the institutional design well before 2010—that is,
roughly, now.
Adaptation of Policy over Time
Temporal complexity also means that the level of protection initially set may
later seem erroneous and need to be updated as conditions and knowledge have
changed. The direction of our likely errors is highly debatable: Are we acting too
hastily or not fast enough? Some say that temporal complexity counsels against
adopting quantity limits on emissions and in favor of more gradual institution
building and research;87 others say that temporal complexity counsels in favor
of adopting more stringent limits now to prevent even greater harms than we
now foresee.88
A central lesson of temporal complexity is the value of adaptation over time.
“Adaptive management” has become a popular idea but an elusive reality.
Designing an adaptive regulatory regime is difficult because knowledge is always
changing, but investors want predictable rules, and the establishment of rules
itself invites investments that entrench opposition to subsequent changes in
those rules. The challenge is to design regulatory institutions that are able to
evolve as conditions and understandings change yet are not so mercurial that
they upset investors’ expectations and undermine their own credibility.
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Several steps toward an adaptive approach are desirable. First, governments
should continue investing in scientific and economic research as regulations are
imposed and reassess regulations regularly in light of the latest expert advice.
The role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and of
national research programs therefore will continue to be crucial. All regulatory
institutions, at every scale, need to be geared toward learning and updating.
Second, the iterative negotiating sessions held under the FCCC and Kyoto
Protocol—roughly one or two Conferences of the Parties each year—can be seen
as fostering the regime’s adaptive capacity. Through this process, parties debate
new emission targets every few years, keeping options open rather than trying to
adopt a permanent set of emission limits once and for all. On the other hand,
this process of sequential decisions creates uncertainty about future targets and
may be at odds with the objective of setting a schedule of continuous emission
limitations over many years so that investments respond accordingly and cost-
effectively. Sequential target-setting should be undertaken transparently so that
investors have advance signals of likely next steps.89
Third, policy should be based on an evaluation of multiple plausible scenar-
ios rather than the choice of a single best scenario. Adaptive management is par-
ticularly valuable in cases such as climate change that involve fundamental
uncertainty about how the system works.90 Our current forecasts may not only
be off a bit but may rely on models that do not even describe reality. One hedge
against this uncertainty is to base policy on a collage of several plausible but con-
ceptually different models and to update this collage over time, with predictions
weighted by experts’ relative confidence in the different models.
Fourth, in the face of such uncertainty, policy should at least begin by insti-
tuting measures that would be desirable under all of these scenarios. These could
include reducing subsidies for energy use, reforming incentives for forest clear-
ing, supporting basic research into low-GHG energy systems, improving the
capacity for technology diffusion and application in developing countries,
reducing emissions of air pollutants in ways that both protect human health and
help prevent climate change, and making social and environmental systems
more resilient against climate changes. At the same time, some measures will be
warranted on grounds of climate protection alone, even in the face of significant
uncertainty.
Assessing the Kyoto Protocol
The FCCC and Kyoto Protocol have done little to address temporal complex-
ity. Kyoto allowed some temporal flexibility by setting targets as average emis-
sions over a 5-year commitment period, 2008–2012. But even greater temporal
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efficiencies could have been achieved through a longer commitment period
(such as 10 years) and through expressly authorizing both banking of early
reductions and borrowing against later limitations (with an interest rate reflect-
ing the time value of abatement). Kyoto did not give any credit for emission
reductions before 2008 (except, oddly, for CDM projects) and did not allow
borrowing. Banking and borrowing make the most sense as early departures
below and above a continuous emission reduction schedule, whereas Kyoto set
a single commitment period target, and negotiations on a second commitment
period target have not yet begun.
Regarding the time to achieve targets, Kyoto announced its targets in 1997
for an effective date beginning 11 years into the future. Eleven years might seem
like a long time, but the practical realities of treaty negotiations and energy sys-
tem investments suggest that a longer time between announcement and effec-
tive date could have been prudent. By the time the Kyoto process neared even
initial ratification it was already 2001, with entry into force expected no earlier
than late 2002, making the 2008 effective date seem too near to achieve sub-
stantial emission cuts without major costs.
Kyoto also set targets that depart significantly from both the least-cost sta-
bilization path and Hammitt’s illustrative optimal path. The Kyoto Protocol
called for emission reductions by industrialized countries of about 5 percent
below 1990 levels by 2012, which corresponds to a U.S. reduction of about
30 percent below BAU in 2012 and a reduction in all industrialized countries’
emissions of roughly 15–20 percent below BAU by 2012. Thus the Kyoto Pro-
tocol appears to require (at least for industrialized countries) much sharper
near-term emission reductions than those required by either Hammitt’s opti-
mal path (which requires global emissions to be 3 percent below BAU by
2010, 5 percent below BAU by 2025, and 20 percent below BAU by 2100) or
the least-cost path to stabilizing concentrations at 750, 650, or 550 ppm (all
of which require essentially zero reduction below BAU through 2025 but
steeper reductions later).91 More fundamentally, Hammitt’s analysis suggests
that the stabilization objective enshrined in the FCCC is not the best goal for
climate policy, even if achieved at least cost, because it neglects the continu-
ous impacts of GHG accumulation over time. Analyses of optimal climate
policy must do a better job of accounting for damages over time and nonlin-
ear climatic effects.92
As to adaptive management, the Kyoto process involves iterated negotiation
of targets, with regular scientific input from the IPCC. This sequential process
of adjustment could be helpful in adapting to new information. But the IPCC
has not done enough to advise the treaty negotiators on the optimal time path
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of abatement. The Kyoto process may well result in repeated updating of its
emission targets, but those updates may not reflect a considered evaluation of
the optimal temporal path for abatement.
Conclusion
Global climate policy is deeply complex. This chapter has examined three kinds
of complexity—causal, spatial, and temporal—and three corresponding innova-
tions in the design of the regulatory regime for climate change. First, the com-
prehensive approach would protect the environment more effectively (avoiding
perverse cross-gas shifts) and at perhaps 60 percent lower cost than a piecemeal
approach. Second, international allowance trading would cost perhaps 70 per-
cent less than fixed national caps, and, under the consent voting rule that pre-
vails at the global level, would be more participation-efficient than alternative
regulatory instruments. Participation is crucial to global success; it has been neg-
lected in the Kyoto and Bonn/Marrakech agreements, but well-designed global
allowance trading holds the promise of engaging both the United States and
China in the future. Third, optimal time paths and adaptive management would
enable climate policy to be flexible as technologies, environmental conditions,
and our knowledge all change over time.
This is not to say that these approaches are perfect, nor that other regulatory
approaches do not have their strengths in other contexts. The administrative
costs of the comprehensive approach could become unreasonable if its scope
were expanded indefinitely. The presumptive advantage of tradable allowances
could diminish if cooperative losers were unimportant to global emissions or if
abatement cost uncertainties were so large that containing those costs through
taxes (or through a price ceiling on allowances) became a higher priority than
participation efficiency and containing climate damages. Optimal temporal
policies could raise questions about the credibility of long-term commitments
by governments. Nonetheless, the advantages of these three policy designs
appear to far outweigh their administrative difficulties.
The phenomena of causal, spatial, and temporal complexity will continue to
challenge and intrigue those who design global climate policy. The Kyoto Pro-
tocol and the Bonn/Marrakech accord have made good progress on compre-
hensive coverage and on emission trading among industrialized countries, but
they have limited sinks, have made meager headway in the effort to secure broad
global participation, and have only begun to address optimal temporal policy
design. Thus there is much work remaining in the design of successful global cli-
mate policy.
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